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Public Entities, Officers, and Employees
Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; community facilities
districts
Business and Professions Code § 10176.5 (amended); Civil
Code § 1 102.6b (new); Government Code § 53347 (repealed);
§§ 53312.7, 53330.3, 53345.8 (new); §§ 53313, 53313.5,
53316.2, 53317, 53318, 53321, 53326, 53330, 53335,
53340.2, 53341.5, 53346, 53356.7, 53359.5, 70139
(amended); Streets and Highway Code § 8807 (repealed); §
8840 (new).
SB 1464 (Mello); 1992 STAT. Ch. 772
Existing law authorizes the formation of community facilities
districts' which may issue bonds2 and levy special taxes 3 to finance
certain public facilities and services. Existing law also requires
certain disclosures5 to be made upon the transfer of real estate.6
1. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53317(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining community facility district
as a legally constituted governmental entity established for the sole purpose of financing facilities and
services); see also id §§ 53318-53329 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (defining the procedures for the
establishment of a community facilities district including the authorization of a written request for
establishment of the district by the legislative body, a resolution of intention, reports on the
establishment, a hearing, and an election of either land owners or by popular election).
2. See UaL §§ 53345.3-53365.7 (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing the issuance of bonds).
3. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3 (authorizing the levying of special taxes); CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 53340.1-53344 (West Supp. 1992) (establishing the procedures for the levying of special
taxes); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. CL 2326, 2336 (upholding the constitutionality of CAL. CONST.
art. XIIIA). See generally Friends of the Library of Monterey Park v. City of Monterey, 211 Cal.
App. 3d 358, 375, 259 Cal. Rptr. 358, 372 (1989) (discussing the authorization of the levying of
special taxes); New Davidson Brick Co., Inc. v. County of Riverside, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 1149,
266 Cal. Rptr. 432, 434 (1990) (discussing attacks on the levying of special taxes pursuant to the
Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982).
4. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53318 (West Supp. 1992); see id. §§ 53313-53313.5 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1992) (defining facilities and services which may be provided through the use of Community
Facilities Districts).
5. See CAL. Ctv. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring disclosures to be
made upon the transfer of residential property).
6. Il § 1102.6 (West Supp. 1992); see UL § 1102.6a (West Supp. 1992) (defining the
disclosure form).
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Under Chapter 772, in the case of transfer of real property subject
to a continuing lien7 securing the levy of special taxes pursuant to
the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act (Act),8 the seller must
make a good faith effort to notify the prospective purchaser of the
lien in the same manner as provided in a prescribed disclosure form.9
Existing law authorizes community facilities districts to finance
designated public facilities and services."0 Chapter 772 provides that
after January 1, 1994, a local agency" may initiate proceedings to
establish a district only if it has first adopted local goals and specified
policies concerning the use of the Act. 1 Chapter 772 further
requires that the goals and policies adopted by any school district in
this regard include a priority access to students residing in a
community facilities district whose residents have paid special taxes
financing the construction of school district facilities.' 3
Existing law permits the legislative bodies of two or more local
agencies to enter into a joint community facilities agreement or a
joint exercise of powers agreement. 14 Chapter 772 mandates that no
local agency which is a party to such an agreement shall have
primary responsibility of forming a district unless that local agency
7. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 992 (6th ed. 1990) (defining lien as a claim, encumbrance,
or charge on property for payment of some debt obligation or duty).
8. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53312-53365.7 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (codifying the
Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982).
9. CAL. Crv. CODE § l102.6b(b) (enacted by Chapter 772).
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53313-53313.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992). The Mello-Roos
Community Facilities Act of 1982 allows, but is not limited to, financing of police and fire protection
services, recreational programs, maintenance of parks and highways, flood and storm protection
services, elementary and secondary school sites and structures, libraries, child care facilities, and the
acquisition, improvement, rehabilitation or maintenance of any real property for the purposes outlined
above. Id
11. See id. § 53317(f) (West 1983) (defining local agency).
12. Id § 53312.7(a) (enacted by Chapter772); see id § 53312.7(a)(l)-(5) (enacted by Chapter
772) (specifying mandatory policies which must be adopted).
13. Id § 53312.7(b) (enacted by Chapter 772); see Jeffrey A. Perlman, State Panel Seeking
Tougher Rules for Mello-Roos Districts, LA. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at A15 (discussing priority for
taxpayers whose children attend new schools in Mello-Roos districts when their taxes have
contributed to the construction of the new school).
14. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 53316.2(a) (amended by Chapter 772).
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meets certain criteria. 5 If a joint community facilities agreement or
joint exercise of powers agreement has been adopted, Chapter 772
permits a community facilities district to finance facilities or services
for an agency other than the agency which formed the community
facilities district.16
Existing law requires that a resolution of intention to establish a
community facilities district state the type or types of facilities and
services proposed to be financed and that a special tax sufficient to
pay for all the facilities and services be levied annually. 17 Chapter
772 requires that those proposed facilities be described to allow a
taxpayer within the district to understand what the funds of the
district may be used to finance."8 Chapter 772 additionally limits
financing to those public facilities and services described in the
resolution.19
Existing law authorizes the issuance of bonds to finance facilities
and services in accordance with the collection of special taxes.20
Chapter 772 additionally provides that the legislative body may sell
these bonds for these facilities and services only if it determines prior
to the sale of the bonds that the value of the real property would be
subject to the tax to pay debt service on the bonds exceeds by at least
three times the principal amount of the bonds to be sold and the
15. Id. § 53316.2(e) (amended by Chapter 772). No local agency which is part of a joint
powers agreement will have primary responsibility unless that local agency is one or more of the
following: A city, a county, a city and county, an agency created pursuant to a joint powers
agreement that is separate from the parties to the agreement, or an agency that is reasonably expected
to have responsibility for providing facilities or services to be financed by a larger share of the
proceeds of special taxes. Id. § 53316.2(e)(l)-(3) (amended by Chapter 772).
16. Id. § 53316.2(c) (amended by Chapter 772).
17. Id. § 53321(c),(d) (amended by Chapter 772).
18. Id. § 53321(c) (amended by Chapter 772).
19. Id. § 53330 (amended by Chapter 772).
20. Id. §§ 53345.3-53365.7 (West Supp. 1992); see New Study Reveals Tax Cap Leads to
Greater Use Bonds, PUB. FIN./WAsHINOTON WATCH, June 15, 1992, at 4 (discussing the increasing
use of special assessment bonds to fund public facilities); Dennis Walters, Mello-Roos Deals Will
Have to Tow the Line, Public and Private Officials Say at Seminar, THE BOND BUYER, May 8, 1992,
at 5 (discussing the purported problems with Mello-Roos district bond issues). See generally Clayton
P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030,
1066 (1990) (discussing use of special assessment district funds).
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Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; criminal history
information of a prospective concessionaire
Civil Code § 1798.24a (new); Labor Code § 432.7
(amended); Penal Code § 11105.02 (new); § 13300
(amended).
SB 1769 (Watson); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1026
Under existing law, no agency1 may disclose 2 any personal
information3 in a way that reveals the identity of the person to whom
21. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53345.8(a) (enacted by Chapter 772). If the legislative body does not
make a determination that the value of real property subject to pay debt service is three times greater
than the principal amount of the bonds to be sold it may issue bonds without such a finding if
approved by a four-fifths vote of the legislative body. Id. § 53345.8(c) (enacted by Chapter 772); see
California, THE BOND BuYER, May 19, 1992, at 28 (discussing Senate Bill 1464 and its
strengthening of Mello-Roos bonds sold in California); Mello-Roos Study Launched By California
Underwriters, CAL. PuB. FIN., June 1, 1992, at 4 (discussing a study by the California Public
Securities Association to examine Mello-Roos financings); Debora Vrana, California School Starts
Foreclosure After Developers Miss Tax Payments, Tm BOND BuYER, June 29, 1992, at 1 (discussing
the foreclosure of a community facilities district in the Temecula Valley Unified School District after
certain property owners failed to remit more than $1 million of a spzcial tax payment).
1. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.3(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining agency).
2. See id § 1798.3(c) (West Supp. 1992) (specifying that "disclose" means to disclose,
release, transfer, disseminate, or otherwise communicate all or any part of any record orally, in
writing, by electronic means, or any other means which would lead to the discovery of any person
or entity).
3. See id § 1798.3(a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining personal information as any information
that is maintained by an agency that identifies or describes an individual, including but not limited
to, his or her name, social security number, physical description, home address, home telephone
number, education, financial matters, and medical or employment history, or any statements made
by, or attributed to, the individual); Perkey v. Department Motor Vehicles, 42 Cal, 3d 185, 193, 721
P.2d 50, 55, 228 Cal. Rptr. 169, 173 (1986) (finding that fingerprints fall within the category of
information that identifies an individual because fingerprints are part of a person's physical
description).
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it pertains, except as specified.4 Chapter 1026 allows disclosure of
personal information to certain entities,5 if a written request is made
to a local law enforcement agency and the information is needed for
screening6 a prospective concessionaire,7 or an affiliate8 or
associate' of a prospective concessionaire, in order to approve the
prospective concessionaire's application for any beneficial interest in
a concession, lease, or other property interest.'" However, Chapter
1026 specifies that any summary criminal history information"
disclosed is limited to criminal convictions. 2
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.24 (West Supp. 1992); see idt § 1798.24(a)-(v) (West Supp. 1992)
(listing the specified exceptions for disclosure of personal information); 64 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 756,
756 (1981) (concluding that a report filed by a county welfare fraud investigator, regarding the failure
of any individual to receive his food stamps by mail, was not open for public inspection); 64 Cal.
Op. Att'y Gen. 575, 575 (1981) (holding that the Carpenter Funds Administrative Office was not
prohibited from learning each carpenter's name, social security number, hourly wage, deductions from
salary, trade, and total number of hours worked, where the carpenter was employed in a project
financed by the California Housing Finance Agency).
5. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 1798.24a (enacted by Chapter 1026) (providing that information
may be disclosed to any city, county, city and county, or district, or any officer or official thereof).
6. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(k)(2)(A) (amended by Chapter 1026) (defining "screening"
as a written request for criminal history information made to a local law enforcement agency).
7. See id. § 432.7(k)(2)(B) (amended by Chapter 1026) (defining prospective concessionaire,
in part, as any individual, general or limited partnership, corporation, trust, association, or other entity
that is applying for a public agency's consent for acquisition of any beneficial ownership interest in
any public agency's concession, lease, or other property right).
8. See id. § 432.7(k)(2)(C) (amended by Chapter 1026) (defining affiliate).
9. See i. § 432.7(k)(2)(D) (amended by Chapter 1026) (defining associate).
10. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1798.24a (enacted by Chapter 1026).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 105(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (West 1992) (defining "state summary criminal
history information" as the master record of information compiled by the Attorney General pertaining
to the identification and criminal history of any person); id § 13300(a)(1) (amended by Chapter
1026) (defining "local summary criminal history information" as the master record of information
compiled by any local criminal justice agency pertaining to the identification and criminal history of
any person).
12. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1798.24a (enacted by Chapter 1026); see CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a)
(amended by Chapter 1026) (defining conviction); Helena Rubenstein Int'l v. Younger, 71 Cal. App.
3d 406, 421, 139 Cal. Rptr. 473, 483 (1977) (stating that the meaning of "convicted" is ambiguous
and better defined as requiring the entry of judgment where a civil disability flows as a consequence
of the "conviction"); see also Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1046, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 306, 311 (1988) (holding that no legitimate public purpose or policy extends to a civil action
for damages predicated upon an invasion of privacy to a person whose arrest resulted in a
conviction).
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Under existing law, no employer13 can ask an applicant for
employment to disclose any nonconviction arrest or detention. 1
4
Chapter 1026 provides that such information may be disclosed to any
city, county, or district, or any officer or official thereof, in screening
a prospective concessionaire, or the affiliates of a prospective
concessionaire. 15 Chapter 1026 further provides that such
information may be used to disapprove the application. 6
Existing law requires the Attorney General to furnish state
summary criminal history information to specified entities when
needed for fulfilling employment, certification or licensing duties.17
Chapter 1026 requires the Attorney General to furnish state summary
criminal history information, pertaining to convictions, upon a
13. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a) (amended by Chapter 1026) (stating that employers could
be public agencies, private individuals, and corporations as employers).
14. Idr Employers are also barred from seeking information concerning referral to or
participation in any pretrial or post-trial diversion program. Id Employers may not utilize this
information for the purposes or hiring, promotion, termination, or any apprenticeship training
program. kd; see Rutherford v. Securities Exchange Comm'n., 842 F.2d 214, 216 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a request by the New York Stock Exchange for arrest and conviction information when
verifying a securities industry registration form did not violate § 432.7 because there was no
employer-employee relationship with the applicant).
15. CAL LAB. CODE § 432.7(k)(1) (amended by Chapter 1026); cf NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 179A.100 (3) (Michie Supp. 1991) (requiring dissemination, to a prospective employer, upon
request, of records of criminal history concerning a prospective employee which reflect convictions
only or pertain to an incident for which the prospective employee is currently within the criminal
justice system). But see White v. State, 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 631, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175, 182 (1971)
(Friedman, L, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (expressing concern that an unwarranted
record of conviction, even of arrest, may ruin an individual's reputation, livelihood, and life); Hon.
Walter J. Karabian, Record ofArrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAC. LJ. 20,21-24 (1972) (setting forth
the negative effects of disseminating records where persons arrested were released, dismissed or
acquitted).
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7()(1) (amended by Chapter 1026). Butsee Gregory v. Litton Sys.,
Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (holding that excluding persons from employment
because of numerous arrests, despite the absense of convictions, violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964
where this policy, regardless of intention, results in discrimination between applicants of different
races and where a showing of business necessity cannot be made), maodifled, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972).
17. CAL PENAL CODE § 11105(b)(1)-(14) (West 1992); see Housing Auth. v. Van de Kamp,
223 Cal. App. 3d 109, 116, 272 Cal. Rptr. 584, 589 (1990) (holding that certification and licensing
as used in § 11105 is limited to the context of employment and occupational certification and
licensing).
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showing of a compelling need,'" to any city, county, city and
county, or district, or any officer or official thereof, when needed to
assist in the screening of a prospective concessionaire and their
affiliates or associates. 9
Existing law allows a local agency2" to furnish local summary
criminal information to specified entities, 21 upon a showing of a
compelling need, when that information is furnished to assist in
fulfilling employment, certification, or licensing duties.22 Chapter
1026 allows the local information pertaining to criminal convictions
to be furnished to any city, county, city and county, or district, or any
officer or official thereof when screening a prospective
concessionaire and any affiliate or associate thereof.
23
KAR
Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; military veteran's--
home and farm purchase loans
Military and Veterans Code § 987.57, 987.62 (amended).
SB 1736 (Rogers); 1992 STAT. Ch. 893
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105.02 (enacted by Chapter 1026) (deeming any local
government's request for state summary criminal history information for purposes of screening a
prospective- concessionaire and their affiliates or associates a "compelling need"); Central Valley
Chapter of 7th Step Found. v. Younger, 214 Cal. App. 3d 145, 151,262 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (1989)
(finding that the dissemination of arrest record information impinges on the fundamental privacy
rights of Californians so that dissemination of such information should only occur when it serves a
compelling state interest); Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 864, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464, 468
(1976) (finding that a compelling interest for dissemination of arrest records was shown where the
state's purpose was to protect the public from recidivist offenders).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105.02 (enacted by Chapter 1026). But see Richard P. Alexander
& Kathleen Walz, Arrest Record Expungement in California: The Polishing of Sterling, 9 U.S.F.L.
REv. 299, 304 (1974) (complaining that the range of individuals and agencies able to obtain
confidential information under § 11105 is already broad and results in arrest records falling into
unauthorized hands despite statutory restrictions).
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13300(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 1026) (defining local agency).
21. See id. § 13300(c)(l)-(10) (amended by Chapter 1026) (listing the specified entities).
22. Ide § 13300(c) (amended by Chapter 1026).
23. lad § 13300(c)(10) (amended by Chapter 1026).
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Prior law required all applications for home and farm purchase
loans to be filed with the Department of Veteran Affairs
(Department)1 within thirty years from the date of the applicant's
discharge from the service.2 Chapter 893 requires all applicants to
file applications for home and farm purchase loans within the time
limits required under applicable federal law and regulations.3
Existing law permits the Department to waive the occupancy
requiremen for up to four years.5 Chapter 893 eliminates the four-
year limit, and requires that the property financed must be occupied
by the owner and is not to become an investment, rental or business
property.,
CPH
1. See CAL. MI. & VE. CODE § 70 (West 1988) (defining the powers and duties of the
Department of Veterans Affairs).
2. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch 330, sec. 2, at 918 (amending CAL MIt.. & VET. CODE § 987.57).
3. CAL. MiL & VET. CODE § 987.57 (amended by Chapter 893); see 38 U.S.C. § 3702(a)(3)
(1992) (providing that any unused housing loan entitlement belonging to a veteran will not expire
until used). But see OR. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3(1)(e) (stating that in order for a veteran to qualify for
a housing loan, the veteran must apply for the loan either within the 30 year period immediately
following the date on which the person was released from active duty in the armed forces of the
United States, or not later than January 31, 1985, whichever occurs last).
4. See CAL. MI. & VET. CoDE § 987.60(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring the veteran
receiving aid to agree that the veteran, or the veteran's immediate family will reside on the property
within 60 days from the day of purchase by the Department and will continue to reside on the
property until all payments due the Department have been paid or until the farm or home is sold).
5. Id § 987.62 (amended by Chapter 893).
6. Id; see United States v. Da Witt, 265 F.2d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 1959) (granting summary
judgment for the United States in a civil action for penalties under the False Claims Act against a
real estate dealer for closing a home sale and loan, knowing that a non-veteran was to acquire the
property); cf Miss. CODE ANN. § 35-7-17(4) (1990) (stating that the Veterans Board will not
consider applications for purchase that would provide the veteran with a second home, or provide
funds to be used for investment purposes). See generally Cal-Vet Home Loans: Serving Those Who
Served For 70years, BusINEss WiRE, Mar. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexus Library, Curmt File
(providing the background and general requirements of the California Veteran home loan program).
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Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; liability for police
department's failure to respond to burglar alarms
Government Code § 845 (amended).
AB 2611 (Burton); 1992 STAT. Ch. 547
Existing law provides a general immunity to a public entity' or
public employee2 for failure to provide police protection or, if such
service is provided, for failure to provide sufficient police
protection.3 Chapter 547 creates an exception 4 to this general
immunity by declaring that a police department may not decline to
1. See CAL. GOV*T CODE § 811.2 (West 1980) (defining public entity).
2. See iUL §§ 810.2, 811.4 (West 1980) (defining public employee).
3. I. § 845 (amended by Chapter 547); see Susman v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App.
2d 803, 822, 75 Cal. Rptr. 240, 252 (1969) (holding that § 845 conferred immunity on the city of
Los Angeles for damages resulting from inadequate police protection during the Watts riots); see also
Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448, 1463, 249 Cal. Rptr. 688, 696 (1988)
(explaining that § 845 was designed to protect the political and budgetary decisions of policy-makers,
who must determine whether to provide police officers or some similar department, from judicial
review in tort litigation cases). In the absence of a statute there can be no liability for a public entity.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980); cf Robert Nortlmiess, Note, Interpreting the Tort Liability of
the State of Ohio: Reynolds v. State, 48 OHIo ST. LJ. 577, 582 n.62 (1987) (enumerating the
sovereign immunity laws of all 50 states).
4. See Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 793, 7 10 P.2d 907, 915,
221 Cal. Rptr. 840, 848 (1985) (holding that the immunity conferred by § 845 does not apply to
common carriers where the driver failed to take other reasonable action, in lieu of providing police
protection, to minimize the chance of harm to the plaintiff during an argument between the plaintiff
and another passenger); Carpenter v. City of Los Angeles, 230 Cal. App. 3d 923, 931,281 Cal. Rptr.
500, 504 (1991) (holding that the immunity conferred by § 845 does not apply where the police had
a special relationship with the victim of a crime and failed to warn him of a known danger); Baker
v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. App. 3d 902, 909,233 Cal. Rptr. 760,764 (1986) (holding that a
public entity cannot be liable, except where it can be established that a duty of care was owed); cf
Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 22, 664 P.2d 137, 139, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233,235 (1983) (explaining
that the questions of duty and breach, in tort cases against a government entity, are always
preliminary to the question of immunity). Many authorities contend that ordinary tort principles
should be used to determine liability for the failure to provide police protection. See generally, e.g.,
Lisa McCabe, Comment, Police Officer's Duty to Rescue or Aid: Are They Only Good Samaritans?,
72 CAL. L. REV. 661 (1984) (discussing Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 664 P.2d 137, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 233 (1983), and concluding that police should be under an absolute duty to rescue and once
undertaken, acts should be judged under a professional standard of care); Gerald P. Krause,
Comment, Municipal Liability: The Failure to Provide Adequate Police Protection-The Special Duty
Doctrine Should Be Discarded, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 499 (1984) (discussing the relationship of police
activity and sovereign immunity and concluding that the special duty doctrine should be discarded
in favor of ordinary tort principles to determine liability for failure to provide police protection).
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respond to a request for service from either a burglar alarm system5
or alarm company 6 referral, solely on the basis of the user's failure
to obtain a required permit.7
BAB
Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; peace officers
Insurance Code § 488.5 (amended); Penal Code §§ 2039,
2045.4, 2048.4, 6050, 6105 (amended); Vehicle Code §
1808.4 (amended).
AB 3442 (Nolan); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1279
Existing law prohibits any insurer from increasing the premium
on a private automobile insurance policy for peace officers, I
members of the California Highway Patrol, or firefighters, due to an
accident which occurs while the insureds are operating an emergency
5. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7590.1(n) (West Supp. 1992) (defining alarm systems);
see also Los ANGELas, CAL, MUN. CODE ch. 10, art. 3, div. 8, § 103,206(a)(2) (1992) (defining
burglar alarm system).
6. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7590.2 (West Supp. 1992) (deflinig alarm company
operator).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845 (amended by Chapter 547); see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
7592.8(c) (West Supp. 1992) (allowing cities and counties to enact ordinances governing false
alarms); id § 7592.8(d) (West Supp. 1992) (allowing cities and counties to enact ordinances requiring
persons who own, rent, lease, or possess an alarm system to obtain a permit to operate an alarm
system); Los ANGELs, CAL, MUN. CODE ch. 10, art. 3, div. 8, § 103.206(b) (1992) (requiring a
person to obtain a permit for the use of an alarm system). Chapter 547 was written in response to
an incident in Southern California where a woman was beaten and raped in her garage while her
home alarm system was activated, yet the local police disregarded the situation, allegedly because
the woman had not obtained the necessary permit. SENATE COMM. ON JUDIcIARY, 1991-92 REPORT
ON AB 2611, at 2 (June 16, 1992). The police arrived only after a neighbor reported the situation.
Id; see County of San Diego v. Department of Health Serv., I Cal. App. 4th 656, 661, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 256, 259 (1991) (holding that a committee analysis may be used to determine legislative intent);
see also Barry Horstman, Police Scrap Policy of Ignoring Silent Alarms, L.A. TIMEs, March 25,
1992, at A3 (reporting an incident where, allegedly because a homeowner failed to obtain the
necessary permit, the police ignored her activated home alarm system while she was being beaten
and raped in her garage).
1. See CAL. INS. CODE § 488.5(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 1279) (defining peace officer).
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vehicle in the performance of their duties2 during the hours of their
employment.' Chapter 1279 expands this provision to include
federal officers and customs agents.
Existing law provides that the home address of the Attorney
General, the State Public Defender, a peace officer, and other
specified persons, 5 appearing in any record of the Department of
Motor Vehicles, is confidential and may only be disclosed to certain
government agencies.6 Existing law further provides that the home
address must remain confidential for three years following
termination of office or employment.7 Chapter 1279 provides that
2. See Sawyer v. Humphries, 587 A.2d 467, 472-73 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that even
though a police officer may be said to be on duty all of the time, a police officer acts outside the
scope of his employment where he acts for his own personal reasons and not in furtherance of his
employer's law enforcement function); Wolf v. Liberis, 505 N.E. 2d 1202, 1206 (In. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that although policemen are on duty 24 hours a day, this fact does not mean that all acts
taken by an off-duty police officer are deemed to be in the performance of his duties as a police
officer).
3. CAL. INS. CODE § 488.5(a) (amended by Chapter 1279); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §
2532 (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2174-B (West 1991) (prohibiting insurers from
raising the premium for a personal insurance policy providing motor vehicle liability or collision
insurance to a law enforcement officer on the basis of one or more accidents involving a motor
vehicle operated by the officer if the accident occurred while the officer was operating a motor
vehicle in the course and scope of employment).
4. CAL. INS. CODE § 488.5(b) (amended by Chapter 1279).
5. See CAL. VaN. CODE § 1808.4(a)(1)-(17) (amended by Chapter 1279) (specifying the
persons to whom Vehicle Code § 1808.4 applies). This section applies to the following persons: (1)
The Attorney General; (2) the State Public Defender;, (3) members of the Legislature; (4) judges or
court commissioners; (5) district attorneys; (6) public defenders; (7) attorneys employed by the
Department of Justice, the office of the State Public Defender, or a county office of the district
attorney or public defender, (8) nonswom police dispatchers; (9) child abuse investigators or social
workers, working in child protective services within a social services department; (10) active or
retired police officers; (11) employees of the Department of Corrections, the Department of the Youth
Authority, or the Prison Industry Authority; (12) employees of a city police department or county
sheriff's office; (13) nonsworn employees of federal, state, and local detention facilities who submit
agency verification that, in the normal course of their employment, they control or supervise inmates
or are required to have a prisoner in their care or custody; (14) nonsworn personnel in local juvenile
halls, camps, ranches, and homes; (15) county counsels assigned to child abuse cases; (16)
investigators employed by the Department of Justice, a county district attorney, or a county public
defender, and (17) the spouse or children of persons listed in this section, regardless of the spouse's
or child's place of residence. IU.
6. Id. § 1808.4(b) (amended by Chapter 1279). Chapter 1279 provides that the information
may be disclosed to a court, a law enforcement agency, the State Board of Equalization, or any
governmental agency to which, under any law, information is required to be furnished from records
maintained by the department. Iai
7. Ma. § 1808.4(c) (amended by Chapter 1279).
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the home addresses of active or retired peace officers must, upon
request, be withheld from public inspection permanently at the time
the information would otherwise be opened.'
CPH
Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; prisoner death records
Government Code § 12525 (amended).
AB 2302 (Burton); 1992 STAT. Ch. 529
Under existing law, a law enforcement agency or the agency in
charge of a local or state correctional facility is required to report in
writing to the Attorney General' all facts in its possession regarding
the death of any person in the custody of that agency or correctional
facility within ten days after the death.2 Prior law required that the
report be available for inspection by any interested parties, except as
to matters deemed privileged by the Attorney General.' Chapter 529
8. Id.; see Braun v. City of Taft, 154 Cal. App. 3d 332, 340,201 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (1984)
(holding that the mere custody of a writing by a public agency does not make it a public record, but
if a record is necessary or convenient to the discharge of a public officer's official duty it is a public
record); Johnson v. Winter, 127 Cal. App. 3d 435,440, 179 Cal. Rptr. 585,589 (1982) (holding that
the burden of demonstrating the need for confidentiality of all the materials in a file or document
which is not expressly exempted rests on the agency claiming the privilege).
1. See CAl. CONST. art. 5, § 13 (providing the powers and duties of the Attorney General).
2. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12525 (amended by Chapter 529); cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 406.11
(West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (requiring the medical examiner of the district in which the death of a
prisoner occurred to determine the cause of death and make such examinations, investigations, and
autopsies as requested by the state attorney); N.Y. CouNTY LA.W § 671(b) (MeKinney 1988)
(requiring the coroner to investigate any death occurring to an inmate of a correctional facility,
whether or not the death occurred inside such facility); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.022 (West
1989) (providing that any person who is required to investigate and report the death of a prisoner and
fails to do so is guilty of a misdemeanor).
3. 1961 Cal. Stat. ch. 2212, sec. 1, at 4558 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12525).
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makes these writings public records4 which are open to public
inspection.5
CPH
Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; privacy
Public Utilities Code § 2894 (new).
SB 1450 (Russell); 1992 STAT. Ch. 263
Existing law prohibits a telephone' or telegraph corporation2
from making specified information3 available to any other person4
or corporation5 without first obtaining the consent of a residential
4. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6252(d) (West Supp. 1992) (defining public records as any
writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used,
or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics).
5. Id § 12525 (amended by Chapter 529); see Braun v. City of Taft, 154 Cal. App. 3d 332,
340, 201 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (1984) (holding that the mere custody of a writing by a public agency
does not make it a public record, but if a record is kept by an officer because it is necessary or
convenient to the discharge of his official duty it is a public record); Johnson v. Winter, 127 Cal.
App. 3d 435,440, 179 Cal. Rptr. 585,589 (1982) (holding that the burden of demonstrating the need
for confidentiality of all the materials in a file or document which is not expressly exempted rests
on the agency claiming the privilege). Chapter 529 provides that nothing in this section permits the
disclosure of confidential medical information that may have been submitted to the Attorney
General's Office in conjunction with the report. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12525 (amended by Chapter
529).
1. See CAL. PUB. UTm. CODE § 234 (West Supp. 1992) (defining telephone corporation); cf.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-217 (1992) (defining telephone corporation as every corporation, company,
association, joint-stock company or association, partnership, or persons used in the conduct of the
business of offering telephonic communication for hire, or which licenses, lets, or permits telephonic
communication for hire); IDAHO CODE § 62-603(10) (1992) (defining telephone corporation as every
corporation or person providing telecommunication services for compensation within the state of
Idaho).
2. See CAL. PUB. UTin. CODE § 236 (West 1975) (defining telegraph corporation).
3. See id § 2891(a) (West Supp. 1992) (specifying the following information: (1) The
subscriber's personal calling patterns; (2) the residential subscriber's credit or other personal financial
information; (3) the services that the residential subscriber purchases from the corporation or an
independent supplier of services using the corporation's lines; or (4) demographic information about
individual residential subscribers).
4. See id § 205 (West 1975) (defining person).
5. See Ud § 204 (West 1975) (defining corporation).
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subscriber.6 Additionally, under existing law, such a disclosure
provides grounds for civil action7 against the corporation.' Under
Chapter 263, the disclosure of any information by a radiotelephone
utility,9 in compliance" with a state or federal court warrant11 or
order, 12 or administrative subpoena,13 issued as specified,14 is a
complete defense against any civil action brought pursuant to existing
law.I5
DLR
6. Id. § 2891(a) (West Supp. 1992); see id. § 2891(d) (West Supp. 1992) (providing the
following exceptions to the restrictions on availability of information: (1) Information provided by
the residential subscriber for the corporation's directory; (2) information customarily provided by tie
corporation through directory assistance services; (3) postal zip code information; (4) information
provided under supervision of the commission by the telephone corporation to a collection agency
only for the collection of unpaid debts; (5) information given to an emergency service agency
responding to a 911 call or any other response to an imminent threat to life or property; (6)
information provided to a law enforcement agency; (7) information required by the commission; (8)
information transmitted between telephone and telegraph corporations; and (9) information required
by the rules and orders of the commission or the Federal Communications Commission to be
provided by the corporation); cf OR. REV. STAT. § 401.765(3) (1991) (providing that any
telecommunications utility that in good faith provides confidential information to emergency services
providers will not be subjected to civil action for damages).
7. See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 30 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (defining civil action).
8. CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2891(e) (West Supp. 1992).
9. See 47 C.F.R. § 22.2 (1991) (defining paging services and public mobile services);
ASSEMBLY SuBcOMMrrrEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE, COmmITEE ANALYSIS OF SB
1450, at 1 (June 9, 1992) (defining radiotelephone utility as a provider of paging and mobile
telephone services). See generally Robert W. Kastenmeier et al., Communications Privacy: A
Legislative Perspective, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 715, 722-730 (discussing communication privacy in
regards to cellular phones and paging devices).
10. See CAL. PUB. UTE. CODE § 2894 (enacted by Chapter 263) (requiring good faith
compliance); People v. Lonergan, 219 Cal. App. 3d 82, 90, 267 Cal. Rptr. 887, 892 (1990) (stating
that good faith is that state of mind illustrating honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to
defraud, or being faithful to one's duty or obligation).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1523 (West 1982) (defining search warrant).
12. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1003 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992) (defining order).
13. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11510 (West 1992) (governing the issuance of an administrative
subpoena).
14. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2894 (enacted by Chapter 263) (specifying the warrant or
subpoena to be issued at the request of a law enforcement official or other governmental agency for
law enforcement purposes).
15. Id. § 2894 (enacted by Chapter 263); see SENATE CoMMrn' ON JUDICIARY, COMMTrEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 1450, at 3 (May 5, 1992) (showing the possible problems of easing the restrictions
on the dissemination of telephone information).
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Public Entities, Officers and Employees; prospective application
of Rider v. County of San Diego
Public Utilities Code § 99550 (new).
SB 1845 (Kopp); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1233
Existing law authorizes cities, counties, and special districts' to
impose retail transactions taxes and use taxes2 for transportation
purposes and requires that special taxes' imposed by these
jurisdictions be approved by a two-thirds vote4 of the electors.5 The
1. See CAL. CONST. arL XIITA, § 4 (stating that cities, counties and special districts, by a
two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of that district, may impose special taxes on such district,
except ad valorem taxes on real property or transaction taxes or sales taxes on the sale of real
property within such city, county or special district); Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n. v.
Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197,201, 643 P.2d 941,945, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324,328 (1982) (defining special
district, as used in Article XIIIA, § 4 of the California Constitution, as a district which has authority
to levy a tax on real property).
2. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6004 (West 1987) (defiming use tax as a tax imposed
under §§ 6201 through 6249 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code).
3. See City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 57, 648 P.2d 935, 940,
184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1982) (defining special tax as a tax levied for a special purpose rather than
being deposited in a general fund utilized for general governmental purposes). Bur see Richmond, 31
Cal. 3d at 216, 643 P.2d at 953, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 336 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (stating that local
agencies could circumvent Article XIIIA, § 4 of the California Constitution by classifying taxes as
special taxes by depositing the receipts in a general fund and making them subject to the specific
purpose for which motivated the tax). Subsequently, the California Supreme Court redefined special
tax as a tax levied to fund a specific governmental project or program. Rider v. County of San Diego,
1 Cal. 4th 1, 15, 820 P.2d 1000, 1009, 2 Cal. Rptr. 490, 499 (1991).
4. See Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 445, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (looking upon
the two-thirds voting scheme as being fundamentally undemocratic in nature because it requires an
extraordinary majority). Accordingly, the language of § 4 was strictly interpreted and ambiguities
resolved in favor of permitting voters in cities and special districts to pass special taxes by a majority
rather than a two-thirds vote. Id.
5. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII A, § 4 (enacted by Proposition 13). The apparent purpose in
enacting Proposition 13 was to restrict the ability of local governments to impose new taxes in order
to replace the property tax revenue losses which would occur. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205-06, 643
P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329. Proposition 13 has been subjected to multiple constitutional
challenges. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208,583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978). The court in Amador held that Proposition 13 was
a constitutional amendment rather than an impermissible "revision," and therefore, appropriate for
the initiative procedure. Id. at 229, 583 P.2d at 1289, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 247. Second, the court held
that Proposition 13 ,did not breach the single subject condition of the initiative process. Id. at 232,
583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250. Third, the court held that Proposition 13 did not deny equal
protection of the laws required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id.
at 237, 583 P.2d at 1294-95, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53. Fourth, the court held that Proposition 13 did
not impermissibly encroach upon the right to travel. Id. at 238, 583 P.2d at 1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at
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California Supreme Court, in Rider v. County of San Diego,6
interpreted a special district,7 as used in the California Constitution,'
to be any local taxing agency created to raise funds for city or county
purposes to replace revenues lost by reason of the restrictions of
Proposition 13. 9 In addition, the Rider decision reinterpreted a
253. Fifth, the court held that plaintiffs did not have standing to assert interference with contractual
obligations. I1 at 242, 583 P.2d at 1298, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 256. Sixth, the court held that Proposition
13 did not abrogate the title and ballot summary requirements for initiatives. Id. at 243, 583 P.2d at
1298, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 256. Lastly, the court held that Proposition 13 was not void for vagueness.
Id. at 247, 583 P.2d at 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 259. The United States Supreme Court has also upheld
the constitutionality of Proposition 13 stating that a state can structure its tax system to discourage
rapid turnover of ownership of homes and businesses, and may conclude that a new owner at the time
of acquiring his property does not have the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher
taxes as does an existing owner. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (1992); see Julie
Koyama, Comment, Financing Local Government in the Post-Proposition 13 Era: The Use and
Effectiveness of Nontaxing Revenue Sources, 22 PAc. LJ. 1333 (1991) (discussing the impact of
Proposition 13 and the effect of the Richmond decision on the taxing authority of local jurisdictions);
Joseph T. Henke & Miles A. Woodlief, The Effect of Proposition 13 Court Decisions on California
Local Government Revenue Sources, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 251 (1988) (examining the role of courts in
interpreting far reaching popular initiatives, how California courts have defined the revenue sources
available to local jurisdictions, and the weaknesses and constitutional constraints on the initiative
process); Arnold P. Schuster & Philip R. Recht, TaxAllocation Bonds in California After Proposition
13, 14 PAC. Li. 159, 162-63 (1983) (asserting that California localities may not have the taxing
power under Article XIIIA, § 4 to back general obligation bonds because of the two-thirds vote
requirement, and describing how localities after Richmond and Farrell could establish non-special
districts and non-special taxes to circumvent the two-thirds requirement).
6. 1 Cal. 4th 1, 320 P.2d 1000, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (1991).
7. The Richmond court construed § 4 in accordance with the natural and ordinary meaning
of its words, disregarding any literal language which may lead to an absurd result, and in order to
fulfill the intent of the framers, the language was given its literal, practical, common-sense
construction in order to meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the people. Richmond,
at 202-03, 643 P.2d at 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 327. Section 4 was construed strictly because the two
thirds majority requirement is perceived as being undemocratic. Id, at 205, 643 P.2d at 445, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 328. The Richmond court stated that they would not assume that the Legislature would try
to circumvent Article XIIIA, § 4 by reorganizing special districts and removing their taxing power
in order to pass taxes by majority vote. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 208, 648 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr.
at 330. The majority affirmed this premise by stating that it was not the purpose in this case because
the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission predated Proposition 13 by two years. 1d, The
majority found that if the Legislature did act to avoid the goals of Article XIIIA by such a device,
the problem could be dealt with when it occurs. Id, In his dissent, Justice Richardson stated that the
government would instinctively pour through the special district opening and create similar revenue-
generating entities. 11d at 213, 643 P.2d at 950, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
8. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4 (enacted by Proposition 13) (empowering special districts
to assess retail transaction taxes and use taxes upon a two-thirds vote by the electorate).
9. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. The Rider court did not
perceive its ruling as overruling Richmond, but characterized the holding in Richmond as applying
only to local districts which, prior to the passage of Proposition 13, did not have authority to levy
property taxes, and then declined to extend such ruling to local districts created after the enactment
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special tax, as used in the California Constitution,10 to mean a tax
levied to fund a specific governmental project or program." Chapter
1233 states that Rider must not be applicable to, or control, any
action or proceeding wherein the validity of a retail transactions and
use tax is contested, questioned, or denied if the ordinance was
adopted by a transportation agency and approved prior to December
12, 1991, the date of the Rider decision.
12
COMMENT
Chapter 1233 applies the rulings in Rider v. County of San
Diego, 13 as they pertain to transportation agencies, prospectively
only. 4 The practical effect of Rider is that if there is sufficient
evidence of intentional circumvention of Proposition 13, an agency
will be deemed a special district and will be able to finance local
municipal functions only by a two-thirds majority rather than a
simple majority. 15 Enactment of Chapter 1233 was necessary
of Proposition 13. Id, at 10, 820 P.2d at 1005, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495; see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §
99550 (enacted by Chapter 1233) (defining transportation agency as any agency, authority, district,
commission, or other public entity organized under provisions of the Public Utilities Code and
authorized to impose a retail transactions and use tax).
10. CAL. CONST. art. XIIA, § 4.
11. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 15, 820 P.2d at 1009, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 499. Accordingly, every tax
levied by a special purpose district or agency would be deemed a special tax thereby requiring the
two-thirds majority. Id,
12. CAL. PUn. UTmL. CODE § 99550 (enacted by Chapter 1233).
13. 1 Cal. 4th 1, 320 P.2d 1000, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (1991).
14. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 99550 (enacted by Chapter 1233). The California Supreme Court
in Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v. Richmond held that a tax implemented by the
Commission and passed by a majority vote of the electorate was not subject to Article XIIA of the
California Constitution because the Commission did not have authority to levy property taxes.
Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 201, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328. But see Rider, I Cal. 4th at 11,
820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496 (defining special district as including any local taxing
agency created to raise funds for city or county purposes to replace revenues lost by reason of the
restriction of Proposition 13).
15. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. Intent to evade
Proposition 13 is inferred whenever the plaintiff has proved the new tax agency is essentially
controlled by one or more cities or counties that otherwise would have had to comply with the
supermajority provision of Article XII, § 4 of the California Constitution. Id. In determining whether
such control exists the court is to consider the presence or absence of the following: (1) Substantial
municipal control over agency operations, revenues or expenditures; (2) municipal ownership or
control over agency property or facilities; (3) coterminous physical boundaries; (4) common or
overlapping governing boards; (5) municipal involvement in the creation or formation of the agency;
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because the Rider court declined to comment on the possibility of
giving its decision prospective effect only. 16 A retroactive
application of the Rider ruling requiring a two-thirds majority vote to
authorize funds would jeopardize many transportation programs
throughout the state because they rely on uninterrupted funding.
17
To illustrate, over the past fifteen years more than twenty
transportation authorities have been established, $1.5 billion in tax
bonds backed by sales receipts are currently outstanding, and $6
billion is expected to be raised by these tax dollars with billions of
dollars more to come in future years. 8 Had the Rider decision been
applied retroactively, it would have been difficult for transportation
agencies to collect or continue to collect the taxes necessary to meet
their obligations and to remain solvent because millions of dollars in
bonds issued by agencies would have been rendered worthless and
millions of dollars in state and federal matching funds lost."9
Furthermore, enactment of Chapter 1233 was necessary to protect
innocent purchasers of public transportation bonds and persons who
entered into contracts with transportation agencies and to protect the
credit rating of public agencies in the state.2" By applying Rider
and (6) agency performance of functions customarily or historically performed by municipalities and
financed through levies of property taxes. M, at 12, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
16. Id at 13, 820 P.2d at 1007,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497. See Walter V. Schaefer, The Control
of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 635-46 (1967)
(illustrating the use by many state and federal courts of prospective overruling and arguing that erratic
results in judicial decision-making can be avoided by focusing attention on reliance as a justification
for prospective overruling). The apparent policy behind retroactive application of an overruling is
reluctance to perpetuate the existing rule. Id. at 631; see Roger R. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective
Overrulng: A Question ofJudicialResponsibility, 28 HAsTINGs LJ. 533, 561 (1977) (suggesting that
prospective overruling be applied only when the new rule is the best of all possible replacements and
the hardship on a party who has relied on the old rule outweighs the hardship on the party denied
the benefit of the new rule).
17. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 1233, sec. 2, at _ (enacting CAL. PUB. UTL. CODE § 99550).
Accordingly, the Legislature relied extensively on the Richmond decision in submitting tax measures
to a vote and in selling bonds to the public, as well as in entering into long-term contracts, in reliance
on tax revenues. Id
18. Rider, I Cal. 4th at 32, 820 P.2d at 1020-21, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510-11 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
19. IM at 32, 820 P.2d at 1021, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
failure to repay bonds would reflect poorly on the credit rating of public agencies. 1992 Cal. Stat.
ch. 1223, see. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PuB. UT. CODE § 99550).
20. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 1233, sec. 2, at _ (enacting CAL. PUB. UrIL. CODE § 99550).
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prospectively only, Chapter 1233 mitigates adverse financial effects
on transportation agencies in California.21
BED
Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; public contracts--
payments withheld
Labor Code § 1730 (repealed and new); §§ 1727, 1731, 1732,
1733, 1772, 1773.2, 1775, 1776 (amended).
SB 222 (Greene); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1342
Under existing law, a public agency awarding public works
contracts1 may withhold payments from the contractor for amounts
which have been forfeited pursuant to the contract or under existing
law.' Existing law additionally requires the awarding body to
21. See Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 21, 820 P.2d at 1020-21, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510-11 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (describing the fiscal effect of the Rider decision if applied retroactively). Justice Mosk
also asserts that retroactive effect would be unfair to plaintiffs who had instituted suits on the basis
of earlier authority. Id. at 33-34, 820 P.2d at 1022, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512. See generally Frank M.
Keesling, Michelin Tire Corporation v. Wages; The Demise of the Original Package Doctrine, 50
S. CA. L. REV. 719, 726 (1977) (arguing that retroactive application of the Michelin decision, which
eliminated a long-standing exemption for import taxes, would be too severe because had importers
knew of the change in law they might have been more diligent in transferring the goods before the
assessment date, or they could delay until after the assessment date thereby escaping the tax). Such
a retroactive effect may discriminate against importers of foreign goods. Id
1. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1720 (West 1989) (defining public works); see also Int'l Brd. of
Elec. Works v. Board of Harbor Comm'r, 68 Cal. App. 3d 556, 562, 137 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1977)
(holding that repair work performed upon equipment temporarily being used by the city of San Diego
was not public works).
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1727 (amended by Chapter 1342). Existing law requires all agencies
to include as a term in the contract that the contractor must pay all of the contractor's workers the
prevailing wage for their position. Id. § 1773.2 (amended by Chapter 1342). Existing law further
requires the contractor to maintain a payroll record for the Labor Department to inspect. Id. § 1776(a)
(amended by Chapter 1342). Contractors who fail to pay the required wage will forfeit the difference
to be withheld by the awarding body. Il § 1775 (amended by Chapter 1342); see Lusardi Const. Co.
V. Labor Comm'r, I Cal. 4th 976, 982, 824 P.2d 643, 646, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 840 (1992) (holding
that the obligation to pay prevailing wage does not depend on the consent of the contractor, and that
the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations may determine that a project is a public work).
See generally 0. G. Sansone Co. V. Department of Transp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 434,448, 127 Cal. Rptr.
799, 806 (1976) (holding that the state may constitutionally withhold the payments without a
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transfer all penalties or forfeitures3 from any contract payment to the
Treasurer4 to become part of the state's General Fund.' Chapter
1342 provides that penalties or forfeitures retained by the awarding
body must be transferred to the Labor Commissioner6 whenever a
contractor fails to bring suit against the awarding body for recovery
within ninety days after completing the contract.7 Chapter 1342
further provides that the division of Labor Standards Enforcement 8
may intervene in a contractor's suit against the awarding body.9
STLIMLM
hearing).
3. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1775 (amended by Chapter 1342) (establishing a $50 penalty
assessment against the contractor for each day an employee is underpaid, and providing that the
Labor Commissioner will set the amount of forfeiture based on the amount that the contractor has
underpaid his employees when compared to the prevailing wage).
4. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12320 (West 1980) (establishing the duties of the State
Treasurer).
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1730 (amended by Chapter 1342); see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16300
(West 1980) (establishing the General Fund); cf ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-321 (1991); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 22-9-301 (Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-53 (West Supp. 1992); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6912 (1991); HAW. REv. STAT. § 104-2 (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para.
39s-1 (Smith-Hurd 1991); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 99.480 (MichiefBobbs-Merrill 1991) (authorizing
payment of the prevailing wage by contractors working on public works contracts to their
employees).
6. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 82 (West 1989) (defining the position and powers of the Labor
Commissioner).
7. Id § 1731 (amended by Chapter 1342). Chapter 1342 authorizes the Division of Labor
to maintain a court action to recover unpaid prevailing wages whether or not it has received an
assignment from the worker to collect the worker's wages. Id
8. See id §§ 79-83 (West 1989) (defining the powers and duties of the Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement).
9. Id § 1733 (amended by Chapter 1342). If insufficient funds are withheld under the
contract, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement or the awarding body may maintain an action
against the contractor. Id § 1775 (amended by Chapter 1342). The Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement must bring the action within 90 days of the completion and acceptance of the work
under the contract. Id
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Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; resident contractor
preferences
Government Code § 14838.2 (new); Public Contract Code §
6107 (new).
AB 2578 (Polanco); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1073
Under existing law, if a state construction project' is expected to
exceed a total cost of $25,000, the appropriate state agency must
solicit bids2 and award the construction project to the lowest
responsible bidder or reject all bids.3 Existing law provides goals4
and preferences for the use of certain materials or labor in
conjunction with construction projects.'
1. See CAL. PuB. CONT. CODE § 10105 (West 1985) (defining project as including the
erection, alteration, improvement, or repair of any state structure, building, or road which exceeds
a total cost of $25,000).
2. See i. § 5100 (West 1985) (defining bid as any proposal to a public entity in competitive
bidding for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building, road, structure, or other
improvement of any kind).
3. Md. § 10108 (West Supp. 1992).
4. See id. § 10115.1 (West Supp. 1992) (defining goal).
5. See CAL. GovT. CODE § 4533 (West Supp. 1992) (providing a 5% bid preference for labor
performed in distressed areas); iL § 4533.1 (West Supp. 1992) (granting bid preference for work
performed by persons with high risk of unemployment); i § 7095 (West Supp. 1992) (providing a
bid preference for companies that hire at least 50% of the labor required to perform a project from
a designated project area); CAL. PuB. CoNT. CODE §§ 10115-10115.10 (West Supp. 1992) (stating
project goals for the participation of women); see also APAC-Mississippi, Inc. v. Deep South Const.
Co., Inc., 704 S.W.2d 620, 624 (Ark. 1986) (upholding the constitutionality of a bid preference
statute challenged on equal protection grounds); Galesburg Const. Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d
745, 750-51 (Wyo. 1982) (upholding the validity of a Wyoming bid preference statute against equal
protection and public policy challenges). But see Associated Gen. Contractors v. City and County of
San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922,934 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a city ordinance granting preferences
to minority-owned businesses violated the equal protection clause); Big D Const. Co. v. Court of
Appeals, 789 P.2d 1061, 1071 (Ariz. 1990) (holding that an Arizona bid preference statute that
granted preference to contractors which paid two consecutive years of state or local taxes violated
the equal protection clause of Arizona's Constitution). See generally Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Effect of Requirement Under State or Local Ordinance Giving Local or Locally
Qualified Contractors a Percentage Preference in Determining Lowest Bid 89 A.L.R. 4th 587, 587-
617 (reviewing the disposition of cases involving the coistitutionality of bid preference statutes).
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Chapter 1073 provides a bid preference to California companies 6
for the awarding of construction contracts equal to that which a
participating non-resident contractor receives in his or her state.
7
Under Chapter 1073, this provision is not to be applied if such
application threatens the receipt of federal funds.8
DHT
6. See CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 6107(a) (enacted by Chapter 1073) (defining a California
company as a business entity having a California contractor's license at the time bids were submitted
and either having its principal place of business in California, having its principal place of business
in a state in which there are no bid preference statutes, or having its principal place of business in
a state in which there is a local contractor construction preference and the contractor has paid more
than $5,000 in sales or use taxes to California for construction-related activity for the five years
previous to the submission of the bid).
7. Id § 6107(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 1073); cf. ARz. R Ev. STAT. ANN. § 34-241 (1990)
(providing a bid preference to contractors who paid state or county taxes within that state for at least
two consecutive years immediately prior to submitting bid); WYo. STAT. § 9-8-302 (1977) (providing
a bid preference for resident contractor of not more than 5%).
8. CAL. PuB. CONT. CODE § 6107(e) (enacted by Chapter 1073); see U.S. CONST., art. 1, §
8, cl. I (setting forth the congressional power to lay and collect taxes); South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203, 207-09 (1987) (holding that Congress has the constitutional authority to conditionally
regulate the disbursement of federal funds so long as such regulations: (1) Seek to further the nation's
general welfare; (2) are unambiguously written; (3) are related to the federal interest that the grant
seeks to further, and (4) are not prohibited by any other constitutional provision). See generally
Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103,
1131-61 (197) (discussing the constitutionality of conditional federal spending).
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